Something I find puzzling is that many people in intellectual circles seem to embrace the so-called eternalist view of time, which holds that the past, present, and future all equally exist already, yet at the same time, in terms of practical ethics, these same people focus exclusively on impacting the future. These two positions do not seem compatible, and it is interesting that no one seems to take note of this, and that no attempt seems to be made at reconciling them, or otherwise examining this issue. 

For why, given an eternalist view of time, should one focus on impacting the future rather than the past? After all, the eternalist view of time amounts to the rejection of the common-sense view that the past is fixed while the future is not, which is the view of time that seems to underpin our common-sense focus on trying to impact the future rather than the past. So how can one reject the common-sense view of time that seems to underlie our common-sense practical focus, yet then still maintain this focus? If the past and the future equally exist already, why focus more on trying to impact one rather than the other?

The only attempted reply I have seen so far, which came from Brian Tomasik, is that if, hypothetically, the present were different, then the future would be different, and hence it makes sense to focus on such changes that would render the future different. The problem, however, is that the same argument applies to the past: if, hypothetically, the present were different, then the past would presumably also have to be different. Tomasik seemed to agree with this point. So I fail to see how this is an argument for focusing on impacting the future rather than the past given an eternalist view of time.

Possible Responses

There are various ways to respond to this conundrum. For example, one could try to argue that there is no conflict between eternalism and focusing exclusively on impacting the future (which seems the prevailing assumption, but I have yet to see it defended). Another path one could take is to argue that we in fact should focus on impacting the past about as much as we focus on impacting the future (a position I find highly dubious). Alternatively, one could argue that it is just as senseless to try to change the future as it is to change the past (something few would be willing to accept in practice). Lastly, one could take the tension between these two widely esteemed views to imply that there may be something wrong with the eternalist view of time, and that we should at least lower our credence in eternalism given its apparent incompatibility with other, seemingly reasonable beliefs.

My Preferred Path: Questioning Eternalism

I would be curious to see attempts along any of the four paths mentioned above. I myself happen to lean toward the last one. I think many people display overconfidence with respect to the truth of eternalism.

In particular, the fact that the equations of the theory of relativity, as they stand, do not necessitate an ontologically existing “now“ does not imply that no such thing exists (where this “now”, it must be noted, is not defined as “clocks all show the same”, as such a now is clearly impossible; yet there is no contradiction in the existence of a unique, ontologically real “present” in which initially synchronized clocks show different times).

In other words, although the equations of relativity do not necessitate the existence of such an ontologically real present, they do not rule it out either. Yet it seems widely believed that they do rule it out, and people thus seem to accept that eternalist view almost as though this ontological position were a matter of logical certainty, when it is not. I think it is important to point this out, since false certainties can be dangerous in unexpected ways (for example, if the eternalist view is mistaken and if it leads us to falsely conclude that trying to impact the future is senseless).

Beyond that, one can question to what extent it makes sense to say — as eternalists often do, and as the name eternalism itself implies — that all moments of time exist “always”? After all, doesn’t “always” refer to something occurring over time? The meaning of claims of the sort that “every moment exists always” is, I believe, less obvious than proponents of eternalism appear to think, and seems in need of unpacking.

A General Note on Our Worldview

I think the tension explored here speaks to a more general point, namely that we often do not derive the practical views we hold  — e.g. that we can influence the future but not the past — from our fundamental ontological views. Instead, our practical views are often derived mostly from tacit common-sense notions and intuitions. This means that the views we hold on various subjects, such as the philosophy of time and practical ethics, might be scarcely compatible. The project of bringing our views across such different areas in concert is, I believe, an important and potentially fruitful one, both for our theoretical views in themselves, as well as for our practical efforts to act reasonably in the world.